INTRODUCTION
This book is concerned primarily with the restructuring among international mobile service providers that has taken place during the ten-year period beginning on 1 January 2004. However, a given structure does not appear fully fledged at a particular point in time, so some attention needs to be paid to how the structure existing in early 2004 came into being. Equally, one of the objects of the book is to look forward to how the structure might evolve in the future.
The structure of this industry is of interest for three reasons in particular. In the first place, mobile communication plays an everincreasing role in modern society and hence the issue of which companies are providing it and the links between them has a geo-political impact. Second, the industry is of huge economic importance as a driver of economic growth. Finally, throughout the entire history of the industrialised world -more than three centuries -no industry has ever evolved so quickly.
Obviously service providers are only part of the story, since this rapid change has encompassed a variety of companies making up the wider technology, media and telecommunications (TMT) sector, which includes anything from software providers to equipment vendors. However, one advantage of concentrating on the service providers is that the sector is relatively homogeneous. Some providers have fixed-wire networks and a small number are conglomerates, but in almost every case their mainand fastest-growing -line of business is currently mobile communication.
Whether in principle that is a good or a bad thing is a moot point. When you provide a service that plays an ever-increasing role in the modern economy, you will be a particular beneficiary during periods of economic growth, but equally in recessionary times you will become in principle highly vulnerable as customers cut back on an ever-rising share of their discretionary spending. What is quite extraordinary, however, given that data networks have been common in most countries for only a decade or so, is the totally unexpected attachment of the general public to staying in contact 24/7. It is not simply that vast numbers of people never switch off their mobile devices, but rather that they cannot bear to ignore a call or text irrespective of the situation or time of day. As a result, social mores have evolved alongside the ever-increasing penetration of mobile devices -penetration levels in all advanced and even many emerging economies commonly exceed 100 per cent, such that if the very young and very old who have no devices are excluded, an average of two devices per person is by no means unusual.
While the sociological implications of recent developments in mobile communication are not the direct concern of this book, it is nevertheless important to remember that what is being described is not taking place in a vacuum, and that service providers are obliged to evolve their structures in line with events outside their direct control. At the very least, they may find that operating in countries somewhat dissimilar to their domestic market is fraught with hazards such as unusual interpretations of the rule of law. Equally, there is still a large number of countries where state-owned service providers are to be found that tend to be treated favourably by governments.
MEASURING INTERNATIONALISATION
There is no shortage of suggestions as to how internationalisation can be measured. Dörrenbächer (2000) and Sullivan (1994) both suggest three broad categories of possible internationalisation indicators. The first of these is structural. According to Dörrenbächer, structural indicators are those that provide a snapshot of the international engagement of a company at any given point in time. One such indicator is the number of countries in which a company is present, while another is foreign assets as a percentage of total assets or the ratio of domestic to overseas employment.
The second broad category of indicators is performance indicators, which measure how well a company is doing overseas. Dörrenbächer (2000: 120) identifies two such indicators as turnover and operating income, whereas Sullivan (1994: 331) prefers R&D intensity, advertising intensity and export sales as a percentage of total sales. Although Gerpott and Jakopin (2005) prefer to use different terminology, they draw attention to foreign income as a percentage of total income.
Attitudinal indicators form the third broad category of indicators. These measure the relationship between a company's home country and its overseas operations. Sullivan (1994: 332) notes the difficulties inherent in measuring such indicators before suggesting that the cumulative international experience of senior managers could be used as a measure. Recognising these difficulties, Dörrenbächer (2000) suggests drawing on Perlmutter (1969) , who identified a range of headquarter/subsidiary relationships. In all, four different relationships are identified -ethnocentric, polycentric, regiocentric and geocentric -and as a company progresses through these sequentially, so internationalisation will increase.
A second attitudinal measure is the psychic dispersion of the international operations of a company. Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul (1975: 308) define psychic distance as those factors 'preventing or disturbing the flows of information between firm and market', and offer examples that include language, culture and political systems. These create information asymmetries and hence uncertainties and risks for inward investors. With this in mind, Johanson and Vahlne (1977) argue that internationalisation is incremental. Companies initially favour foreign markets that are close in terms of psychic distance to their home market before expanding into more distant ones, and as they enter each market their investment increases over time. While there has been some discussion as to the usefulness of this concept and how it may be measured, 1 one widely used approach was suggested by Kogut and Singh (1988) , who draw on Hofstede (1980) to rank countries relative to a specified country. An alternative methodology is to use the ten country clusters identified by Ronan and Shenkar (1985) , with a company having a presence in, say, five of the clusters being credited with a score of 50 per cent (Sullivan, 1994) .
It is clearly possible to argue that the use of the individual aforementioned indicators provides an incomplete picture of internationalisation. For example, although a company may have a presence in 20 countries, these investments may generate only a small fraction of the company's overall revenues and/or account for a small proportion of its employees. As a consequence, some authors have sought to develop composite indices of internationalisation that combine several hitherto separate indicators. For example, Ietto-Gillies (1998) proposed a composite index that combines the ratio of foreign to total assets, sales and employment with a measure of the number of countries in which the company could be present if it so wished. UNCTAD (2007) uses these measures but in the form of two separate indices: a transnationality index (TNI) and an internationalisation index (II). The former consists of the average of the ratio of foreign to total assets, sales and employment, while the latter is calculated by dividing the number of foreign affiliates by the number of all affiliates. While this approach has its attractions, the inclusion of companies from small countries is likely to distort the indices since, according to Hassel et al. (2003: 721) , they have a greater proportion of their operations abroad. In other words, the indices do not control for country size. Sullivan (1994) combined nine measures -five performance-based, two structural and two attitudinal -into a composite index of internationalisation. However, the identification of relevant measures and their subsequent combination into a composite index is by no means straightforward. By demonstrating the range of measures that are available, Dörrenbächer (2000) also highlights how different indicators have been developed to measure ostensibly the same phenomenon. Even assuming that agreement can eventually be reached on which measures are to be chosen, problems are likely to emerge when attempts are made to combine them into a composite index, as demonstrated in Sullivan. Although Ramaswamy et al. (1996: 176) welcomed the move away from a single measure of internationalisation, they suggested that internationalisation is more complex than indicated by Sullivan. They argued that it was unclear how the various components of the index related to one another, and by combining this point with other criticisms they concluded that attempting to create a composite index was premature. Not surprisingly, Sullivan disputed this, claiming that his original article had been misunderstood.
Although the literature provides a wide array of possible ways through which internationalisation could be measured, some are easier to implement than others. A key factor that determines which measures can, and which cannot, be used is the availability of data. By no means all internationalised service providers describe their operations in detail. As a consequence, it is often difficult to determine, for example, the exact scale of their investments or their subscriber numbers. A company may report an aggregated figure for capital expenditure without making clear where, or in what, it was invested. Furthermore, the data may be inconsistent from year to year. Mobile operators may be obliged to restate their accounts to reflect changes in accounting rules or may switch items within the accounts (as happens, for example, when a network holding is put up for sale). As a result, longitudinal analysis may prove to be unsatisfactory. Analysis may accordingly have to be directed exclusively towards data that are published regularly on a suitably disaggregated basis.
These issues present difficulties when using the standard databases for the sector. For example, UNCTAD (2007) identifies France Télécom as the second-most internationalised service provider, but neglects to make clear how dependent it is on France and a handful of other countries for its subscribers. Moreover, the choice of the parent company as the preferred unit of analysis can potentially obscure how subsidiaries are faring in the international sphere of operations. UNCTAD identifies nine telcos among the top 100 non-financial companies ranked by assets. Not only does this overlook, for example, the mobile activities of Hutchison Whampoa, which is classified as 'diversified', but it also ignores the significant handset business of Samsung Electronics in the vendor sector.
The performance of individual investments is also obscured when partially owned operations are consolidated with those that are wholly owned. Financial data are frequently aggregated and consolidated, with the result that there is insufficient detail to determine the revenues and profits of specific investments. Dassler et al. (2002) and Gerpott and Jakopin (2005) are able to conduct their financial analyses of operators only by limiting their samples to American, European and Japanese companies whose financial reporting requirements are comparatively onerous and hence provide relatively detailed data.
As a consequence of the limited availability of data, there is a tension between the comprehensiveness of the analysis and its level of detail. Being comprehensive will increase the number of operators included in the sample set and hence provide a better picture of internationalisation within the mobile sector, but will do so at the expense of detail. In contrast, upping the level of detail will provide a richer understanding of the internationalisation process but one based on a smaller sample set, and thereby hamper efforts to comment on changes at the sector level.
Overall, the extensive internationalisation of the telecommunications industry that has occurred since the mid-1980s has resulted in a diverse and substantial literature. Part of this literature has examined the internationalisation of equipment vendors (see, for example, Pehrsson, 1996; Steinbock, 2003 Steinbock, , 2010 or how technological change within the industry occurs (see, for example, Gao, 2014; Martinelli, 2012) . The internationalisation of operators has also been examined (see, for example, Curwen, 2002; Curwen and Whalley, 2004 , 2008 , 2010 Eliassen and Sjøvaag, 1999; Sutherland, 2007; Whalley and Curwen, 2003) . As part of this, the time at which operators enter a particular market has also been examined (see, for instance, Sung, 2014; Whalley and Curwen, 2012b) , as has the organisational structures through which internationalisation is undertaken (see, for example, Luiz and Stephan, 2012; Sutherland, 2014; Curwen, 2012b, 2013) . How the structure of markets influences internationalisation and the success of operators has also been addressed (see, for example, Pogrebynakov and Maitland, 2011; Sarkar et al., 1999) .
In recent years, a significant part of the literature has examined the diffusion of telecommunication services. While this has focused largely on the diffusion of mobile telecommunication services (see, for example, Bohlin et al., 2010; Bijwaard et al., 2008; Gupta and Jain, 2012; Islam and Meade, 2012) , the diffusion of specific types of handsets has also been investigated (Lee and Lee, 2014) . The influence of regulation on the diffusion of mobile telecommunications has been investigated, to see, for instance, the impact of calling or receiving party pays on penetration rates (Dewenter and Kruse, 2011) or how the lack of competition within a particular country shapes access to mobile services (Thakur, 2012) . The literature has also explored the socio-economic opportunities that arise from the widespread diffusion of mobile telecommunications. Not only does the widespread availability of mobile handsets enable individuals to communicate with one another, but such devices also facilitate the development of services in sectors as diverse as banking and healthcare (Curwen and Whalley, 2011) .
Although the internationalisation strategy of a company may encounter difficulties, it is generally seen as beneficial. Internationalisation has been integral to the development of competitive markets. Foreign direct investment in the form of new entrants that have competed against incumbent operators has brought about a varied array of socio-economic benefits. This foreign direct investment has enabled the internationalising operator to expand into new markets -it has not only enabled them to generate additional revenues and profits but also to defend their domestic markets. Moreover, internationalisation enables the company to diversify, reducing its risks as well as broadening the sources of its revenues and profits.
Although there are many benefits associated with internationalisation, a recent observation by Obiodu (2012) suggests that the financial benefits that accrue to the operator through internationalisation are not as clear-cut as previously thought. Obiodu (2012) suggests that widening the internationalisation of an operator does not necessarily lead to improved performance. While some aspects of an operator's financial performance appear to be correlated with size -such as net debt, number of employees and EBITDA (earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation) -other aspects, such as EBITDA margin and return on capital employed, do not. That further internationalisation does not necessarily result in greater financial performance is an interesting suggestion, not least because it challenges one of the major drivers of the telecommunications industry during the past two decades.
Obiodu (2012) is inevitably thin on detail, as is to be expected from a short note that highlights paid consultancy. What this document does, perhaps surprisingly, is to draw attention to the data used in a 'statistical analysis' of the financial results of 20 companies between 2000 and 2011 (Obiodu, 2012: 8) . Although the 20 companies included in the analysis are drawn from a wide range of countries, a substantial number of them are based in Europe and quite a few engage in several lines of business while others are largely mobile or fixed-wire orientated. This diversity raises questions as to the appropriateness of the sample. Of greater concern, however, is the source of data, since it is not clear what this is. Consultants could purchase data from other consultants. Alternatively, they could collect the data for themselves from the annual reports of telecommunication companies. The former option is likely to be expensive and the latter time-consuming.
It is perhaps because of these methodological challenges that relatively little attention has been directed towards retreat of telecommunications companies from their overseas forays. Although there is some discussion of de-internationalisation -see, for example, Benito and Welch (1997) , Nummela and Saarenketo (2012) and Turcan (2011) -and reinternationalisation (Freeman et al., 2011) in the wider international business literature, these issues have been largely overlooked by the telecommunications community. Having said this, Curwen and Whalley (2004: ch. 3) detail the exit of BT from many of its overseas markets and Curwen and Whalley (2008: ch. 8 ) outline the retreat of the US-based 'Baby Bells' back to their home market. While discussing the impact of private equity ownership on TDC, the Danish incumbent, Lemstra and Groenewegen (2012) illustrate how it divested itself of its international holdings.
RANKING THE COMPANIES
As a first step, it is useful to examine the picture presented by the FT500 as set out in Table 1 .1. Size is defined here by reference to the market values of the companies listed, the reasons for which are explained in the preamble to the FT500 in the Financial Times. Coverage is restricted to companies with at least 15 per cent of their shares in the public domain. Companies are ranked on the final day of each of ten successive years concluding in 2012. As can be seen, once a company leaves the FT500 it is unusual for it to return and quite rare for it to do so after a gap of more than one year, although care must be taken to allow for the consequences of Merger and Acquisition (M&A) activity both in this respect and in terms of sudden and rapid changes in the rank of individual companies.
The first conclusion to be drawn from an examination of , subsequent to which there was a minor recoverybut one that did not last through 2013, which witnessed a further net loss of three companies. However, this disguises a significant statistic, which is that whereas there were 25 companies in the top 250 in 2003, there were only 16 such companies in 2012. Furthermore, discounting the minor aberration of América Móvil in 2003, the top 12 companies had remained among the top 250 throughout the entire decade, so the slide down the top 250 rankings must be found elsewhere -France Télécom (now Orange) should also perhaps be added to the 12 as it was only in 2012 that its ranking fell below 250.
Generally speaking, even those numbered among the top 250 throughout the period ended it with a ranking below that held in 2003 -the fact that the only real exception is China Mobile hardly comes as a surprise. So the overall conclusion must be that, taking into account a period covering both good and bad years in terms of economic growth, either the mobile sector has declined in importance relative to other sectors or a significant number of individual companies in other sectors have grown rapidly whereas companies in the mobile sector have not done so.
Now this appears at first sight to be somewhat counter-intuitive, since, as we have previously noted, the mobile sector appears to play an ever-increasing role in modern society. However, a number of factors spring immediately to mind. For example, it may be that there has been a shift in economic power among different parts of the communication industry as a whole, and in particular one whereby service providers have essentially become fat pipes along which data are transported whereas the creators of those data and some of the equipment vendors have grown relatively prosperous. Furthermore, it may be that service providers have been subjected to a barrage of regulations affecting such matters as termination fees -what can be charged to terminate a call originated on another network -or what can be charged for international connectivity (roaming charges).
These matters will be addressed at a later point in the text. Meanwhile, it is necessary to examine Table 1 .1 in a little more detail. Of the four new entries in 2012, only two were nationwide mobile incumbents. Whether the other two US-based companies will survive in the FT500 is therefore a moot point. It may be noted that only two nationwide incumbents in the USA made the FT500 in 2012 because Sprint Nextel had long been mired in restructuring problems and T-Mobile US was too small to qualify. This appears, oddly, to be less than is the case for tiny Hong Kong, but the mainland Chinese companies are headquartered there and Hutchison Whampoa is a massive conglomerate that has never relied on mobile communication for a large share of its overall valuation. A notable feature is that all three nationwide incumbents from Japan are present in the FT500.
Altogether, 21 companies survived within the FT500 during the entire period, with two others missing a single year and a further two disappearing only in 2012.
2 It is noteworthy that they are both based in Western Europe and one, Telecom Italia, was once a powerhouse in the mobile sector. It may be argued that European incumbents are mostly located in countries with relatively small GDPs, so one would not expect them to register among the world's largest companies, but the latter are almost all international in operational terms and Telenor and TeliaSonera are clearly not listed by virtue of their modest domestic operations but because of their numerous overseas subsidiaries. Hence the disappearance of Telecom Italia must reflect either a change in its overseas holdings or pressures in the domestic market that have caused a deterioration in its market value, in which case they will be also be occurring elsewhere in Europe -and, indeed, Telenor was (marginally) the only exception to this assertion in 2012.
It is possible to argue that market values by themselves give a distorted view of the health of the sector, but even allowing for the difficulties in comparing revenue streams exclusively generated by the provision of mobile services, and adjusting for a variety of financial year-ends, there will inevitably be a fairly close correlation between the movement of gross revenues and/or net profits because it is precisely to those kinds of financial data that markets respond in terms of the value placed on shares.
For data on a variety of financial and other matters rather than market values it is useful to consult the Global 100 -the latest version published in October 2013 is available at www.totaltele.com. This covers fixed-wire as well as mobile operators and the dates are not quite the same as for Table 1 .1, but it is of interest to compare the rank order as follows.
Where gross revenues are concerned, after adjusting for the absence of DoCoMo and omitting Hutchison Whampoa because it is a conglomerate, there are eight entries among both top ten lists that coincide. The exceptions are Telstra, which ranks 17th for gross revenues, and Singapore Telecom, which ranks only 29th. In other words, these are operators that are valued surprisingly highly given their gross revenues. Conversely, France Télécom/Orange has a market value that seems unusually poor Notes: given its gross revenues (equivalent to those of América Móvil), but 2012 does seem to have been something of an aberration in respect of its market value. Other operators simply lag the total revenues of the eight most highly valued by such a margin that it would be most surprising if they had a higher rank in Table 1 .1. Looking below the respective top ten is also instructive. Thus we discover that the likes of MTN, TeliaSonera, Rogers and (especially) Chunghwa are seemingly valued too highly given their gross revenues, whereas the converse is true of the likes of Sprint, VimpelCom, KPN and Telecom Italia, where the latter two are respectively 23rd and 13th in terms of gross revenue but do not even make an appearance in the FT500.
It is possible that these discrepancies can be explained by consulting the Global 100 list in terms of net income. The first thing to note here, however, is the potential for huge annual movements that are relatively rare in the case of market values and gross revenues. During 2012/13, for example, VimpelCom rose by 44 places to 19th and OTE rose by 34 places to 47th, whereas Deutsche Telekom fell by 54 places to 92nd and Vodafone fell by 33 places to 35th. In the case of Deutsche Telekom, the reason was that it had acquired MetroPCS in the USA, which generated an accounting loss of nearly €5 billion on a one-off basis. After adjusting for these notable discrepancies, there appears to be a fairly close correlation between those operators with high rankings in terms of market value and in terms of net income.
The above suggests that, aside from financial data, there is one other factor to which the markets pay close attention that is relevant to the current discussion, namely M&A activity real and/or imagined.
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS
Historically, the structure of the mobile service provider sector was significantly influenced by factors such as privatisation. However, there were relatively few privatisations during the period 2008 to 2013 inclusive, most obviously because so many state-owned operators had already been sold off, and some recent attempts to privatise have been unsuccessful due to the reluctance of prospective private sector buyers to pay what they regard as inflated prices in a competitive market -for example, in respect of 49 per cent of Onatel in Burundi and 79 per cent of Kyrgyz Mobile.
In recent times there has been considerable discussion as to whether a 'bubble' is present similar to that which manifested itself during the late 1990s -see, for example, Curwen (2011) . In practice, this discussion is concerned not with service operators but with other kinds of companies in the TMT sector such as Facebook. Nevertheless, it is worth reminding ourselves at this point just how high valuations rose among service providers during the period 1999 to 2001 inclusive before the entire TMT sector fell abruptly back to its pre-1999 valuations. It is necessary to make some allowances for inflation when viewing these sums in terms of current valuations, which makes the first two entries all the more remarkable even if MCI WorldCom was itself to crash into oblivion at a later date. But the share price of Vodafone remained depressed for roughly a decade after its successful bid for Mannesmann, so the financial markets made their views clear on the (retrospectively) absurd valuations placed on anything connected with the TMT sector at that time.
All the above makes inspection of Table 1 .2 especially interesting. As can be seen, there have been some very expensive takeover bids during the period since end 2004 -the term M&A is somewhat misleading because in this sector there are virtually no true mergers as such. However, it should first be noted that the table does not contain the deal completed in September 2013 whereby Verizon Communications agreed to pay Vodafone $130 billion in return for its 45 per cent stake in Verizon Wireless -not listed because Verizon Communications already owned a controlling 55 per cent stake and hence it was not a takeover bid or merger as such. Interestingly, an unofficial bid of $54 billion was allegedly made in May 2006 for the same stake. During the same period, the main focus of takeovers involving serious money switched to the USA. Given the small number of nationwide incumbents and the size of the market, this may seem somewhat surprising -and hence is investigated in detail in Chapter 9. Nevertheless, both T-Mobile USA and Sprint Nextel became takeover targets (not to mention smaller operators such as MetroPCS and Leap Wireless), with over $100 billion being committed in principle. But US operators were not merely involved in taking over each other. In what can only be described as something of a volte face, signs appeared that the period of US isolationism by US operators -the modest stake in América Móvil held by AT&T is treated in this text as an investment because of the absence of any control over operational matters -was about to end. In June 2013, AT&T made the largest bid recorded in the table, targeting a European operator with a large international portfolio. Not surprisingly, the Spanish government stepped in to squash any thoughts of proceeding to a formal offer -the Italian government had previously reigned supreme as the most xenophobic in Europe and even tried to wrest back the title by interfering with Telefónica's attempt to build up a bigger stake in Telecom Italia.
That the AT&T approach was friendly can be explained fairly easily by reference to the amount of debt to be inherited, and, as will become evident in Chapter 10, Telefónica has subsequently been forced to look for an alternative solution to this problem -for example, it agreed to sell its networks in Ireland (in June 2013) and the Czech Republic (in October 2013). KPN was the next European operator to solicit an approach -in part and as a whole -with the attentions of América Móvil setting off a further bout of xenophobia acting as a deterrent to further activity. However, rumours circulating during October 2013 indicated that a much bigger European prize might again be in the sights of a US invader since, stripped of its stake in Verizon Wireless and with a large part of the proceeds distributed to its shareholders, Vodafone now appeared to be vulnerable to a takeover by AT&T.
CONCLUSIONS
Restructuring goes in phases that reflect the general economic environment. During the late 1990s, there was a speculative bubble that resulted both in wholly unrealistic market valuations for TMT companies and a surge in M&A activity, which ground to a virtual halt in 2002 when recession struck. In 1999, there were 15 entries in the table in Curwen and Whalley (2008) corresponding to Table 1 .2, and that number was not matched again until 2005 after the economic recovery had become established. The year 2006 witnessed the return of the mega-bid, but once again this lasted only as long as the world economy remained buoyant. However, as shown in Table 1 .2, after rolling along at roughly the level of six per year for several years, there were 12 entries in 2013, so clearly something significant is taking place, although there is no suggestion this time around that it is a speculative bubble comparable to the late 1990s because, as noted above, most service providers are suffering from relatively modest market valuations.
